The rise of OPEC in the 1960s also helped to undermine the global position of US capital by shifting the balance of power and revenue flows from (primarily US-based) multinational oil corporations to oil-exporting states. The oil-price spikes following 1973 Arab oil boycott and the Iranian revolution of 1979 were associated with – but not the direct cause – of the protracted recession that brought about the collapse of Fordism–Keynesianism. Nonetheless, the twenty-fold increase in the price of oil, from $2.00 per barrel in 1973 to $40.50 per barrel in 1981, deepened and extended the inflationary element of the stagflation syndrome.

During the oil boom of the 1970s, a deluge of petro-dollars washed over the Middle East, lubricating the transition to a new economic order. Governments of oil-exporting states (especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, who had large oil reserves and relatively small populations to absorb them) came to control enormous concentrations of petroleum revenues. International lending to Middle Eastern countries increased dramatically, partly motivated by the desire to recirculate petro-dollars. Massive numbers of workers from countries with little or no oil (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen) migrated to oil-exporting states that undertook major programs of construction and development (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya). Remittances of migrant workers effected a limited redistribution of petroleum revenues, as did Arab development aid to Egypt (until the peace treaty with Israel in 1979) and to the occupied Palestinian territories (until the 1991 Gulf War), and the export of goods and services to Iraq by Turkey and Jordan.

Multinational oil companies enhanced their profits dramatically during the oil boom and regained much of the power they had lost to OPEC and the exporting states when prices collapsed in 1985–86. Declining oil prices curtailed the development plans of oil-exporting countries and diminished their demand for labor, although Iraq's demand for labor power to replace soldiers occupied by the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War partially compensated for the declining demand for labor in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya. The Gulf oil countries, and even more so Algeria, were under pressure to repay international debts contracted with the expectation of high oil revenues.

The emblem of the demise of Middle Eastern state-led development was Egypt's open-door (*infitah*) economic policy announced in Anwar al-Sadat's April 1974 "October Working Paper." Despite this and other grand pronouncements, there was little structural change in the Egyptian economy in the 1970s and early 1980s (Richards 1991). Nonetheless, a new class of importers, financiers, middlemen, and profiteers began to

form. Some of its members were self-made; others used the assets and connections available to them as members of the managers of public enterprises; others revived and reconfigured the fortunes of monarchy-era elite families. US aid linked to the peace with Israel, oil exports, tolls from the reopened Suez Canal, renewed international tourism, and remittances from migrant workers masked the depth of the crisis of import-substitution industrialization. These service and rent activities generated sufficient hard currency to avert a crisis and enabled the government to avoid policy choices that would reduce its support from the legions of white- and blue-collar workers employed in public enterprises and the state apparatus.

The end of the oil boom in 1985–86 and the explosion of third-world debt, signaled regionally by the 1978 Turkish foreign-exchange crisis and globally by the 1982 Mexican default, made the Egyptian state more vulnerable to pressure from the new entrepreneurial class and the Bretton Woods institutions, resulting in more intense social conflict and, ultimately, a more decisive transition to the new economic order following the Gulf War. The pressures of international debt contributed to similar processes, with differences in timing due to local circumstances in Turkey, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Israel.

Syria and Iraq do not figure prominently in this story. These regimes proclaimed their desire for economic changes and did cut back the public sector and roll back agrarian reform. State-led associations of workers and peasants were crippled in the process (Springborg 1986; Springborg 1987; Lawson 1992; Lawson 1994; Hinnebusch 1994; Perthes 1994). But the persistence of exceptionally authoritarian and patrimonial regimes preoccupied with the Iran–Iraq war, the civil war in Lebanon, and confrontations with the United States or Israel blocked the possibility of any substantial economic liberalization in Syria and Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s.

The Washington consensus

The IMF and the World Bank began to promote a neo-liberal program of export-led development, private enterprise, and integration into the world capitalist market after the "successful" policy experiment in Chile following the 1973 military coup. The debt crisis of the 1980s allowed the Bretton Woods institutions and the US government to promote this program – the Washington consensus – even more forcefully by attaching conditions to the loans offered to ease the debt crisis (stabilization). Debt-stricken countries were urged to restructure their economies to enable them to continue repaying their debts (structural adjustment).

The typical IMF/World Bank stabilization and structural adjustment program reduced state subsidies on basic consumer goods, thus raising the cost of food and other necessities, cut government spending on social services (education, health, social welfare), and reduced investments in the public sector. Workers, government bureaucrats, and others on fixed incomes bore a disproportionate share of the pain of these austerity measures. Peasant incomes were supposed to rise due to elimination of subsidies, establishment of market-based prices for agricultural goods, and opportunities to market crops freely. But capitalist agribusiness, rather than peasant families, was the main rural beneficiary of the new economic orientation.

Despite *pro forma* rhetoric about promoting economic growth and raising the incomes of the poor, in the 1980s neo-liberal policies were promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions and the US government as an end in themselves. A prominent moderate critic of the Washington consensus notes: "It is roughly accurate to argue that in the early 1980s the international financial and development agencies pressed debtor governments to subordinate virtually all other goals to stabilization and adjustment" (Nelson 1989: 14). Such single-mindedness is not simply a consequence of professional narrowness or policy errors. It is rooted in a reconceptualization of what an economy is and how and for whose benefit it functions. This discursive shift was an integral part of the social reformation of the working class and the peasantry of the Middle East and the fitful integration of the region into the new international capitalist order of post-Fordist flexible accumulation.

Fordism constructed large-scale, mass-production enterprises with a high component of fixed capital, a long time-horizon for amortization, and a strategic perspective (even if imperfectly realized) of transforming local social, cultural, and gender relations through training and employing a stable labor force and producing commodities for the local market. The post-Fordist regime of flexible accumulation entails huge state subsidies to capital, limiting workers' rights, and an enclave strategy of locating facilities in tax-free areas (Port Said in Egypt or the Erez and Karni enterprise zones on the border of the Gaza Strip) or locations with little previously existing social fabric (Jubayl in Saudi Arabia and the new satellite cities of Cairo). Investors pursuing post-Fordist accumulation seek reduced fixed-capital investment, quicker turnaround on investment, less social commitment to the local labor force, and a global export orientation. Fordist-style production necessary for middle-class and elite consumption is increasingly relocated to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This is no longer the leading edge of the global economy. Aside from providing employment – often less stable and with fewer social benefits than

older public sector enterprises – states are less concerned with regulating the social impact of capital on local communities.

The neo-liberal conception of an economy eliminates questions about whose interests it serves. Advocates of the Washington consensus believe that "all things being equal" economies operate according to scientific principles and that markets distribute goods most efficiently. Designating it as "science" enhances the power of this belief. Few advocates of the Washington consensus argue that an economy should privilege the interests of multinational capital and international financial institutions. It just happens to work out that way when neo-liberal policies are dogmatically applied. Those who advocate these policies are well rewarded and are subject to no democratic accountability regardless of the accuracy of their predictions. Those who do not are usually considered "second rate" or worse.

The neo-liberal belief system can never be conclusively confirmed because all things are never equal. Unpredictable political events often affect how economies operate. For example, military coups cleared the way for aggressive implementation of IMF structural adjustment plans in Turkey in 1980 and Tunisia in 1987. Cancelation of nearly half of Egypt's $55 billion foreign debt as a political favor in return for participating in the US-led coalition against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War opened the way to concluding a successful agreement with the IMF and gave the regime sufficient political credit to begin the long-delayed privatization of public-sector enterprises.

Lest they appear to be "unscientific," even moderate critics commonly adopt the rhetoric of the Washington consensus. Who can oppose "economic stabilization," or "structural adjustment"? These benign terms and others such as "reform," "liberalization," "efficiency," and "rationalization" are nearly universally employed to describe the transformations envisioned by the Washington consensus. "Cutting public investments in housing, health, and education," "upward redistribution of income," "increasing inequality," "diminishing the influence of trade unions and peasant associations," "increasing the power of private capital," and "upward redistribution of agricultural land" are more difficult to defend. Yet these are common effects of neo-liberal programs.

Proponents of the Washington consensus often argue that despite the immediate pain, these policies will promote economic growth and thereby increase the incomes of the poor in the long run. Turkey is widely considered a successful example of reform based primarily on the rapid growth in exports of manufactured goods in the 1980s, when Washington consensus policies prevailed. But economic growth from 1962 to 1977, under a regime of state planning and import substitution, was as good as

that of the 1980s. "The verdict would seem to be that expected benefits of reform and liberalization programs have at best materialized unevenly and rather slowly" (Hansen 1991: 391–95).[1] Nonetheless, the contradictions of import-substitution industrialization may have made it impossible to sustain high levels of growth beyond the mid-1970s. No one can know yet the long-term effects of the new policy. But after a decade of structural adjustment programs, the World Bank admitted that there was no "straightforward" way to assess their success and "no conclusive evidence on growth" (World Bank 1991b: 114). Surely if a stronger case could be made for the efficacy of these policies, the World Bank would be making it loudly and forcefully.

Along with a new conception of the economy, the Washington consensus tends to eliminate workers and peasants as social categories altogether, since their very presence recalls the social compact of the era of authoritarian-populism, which the current regimes can not fulfill. One expression of this trend is the widely used textbook *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Richards & Waterbury 1990). The first edition includes the subtitle, *State, Class, and Economic Development*. This was removed from the second edition, and the conceptual framework of the study was redesigned, replacing "class" with "social actors" (Richards & Waterbury 1996). This might be understood as eliminating a residue of Marxist dogmatism, although the first edition of the text was hardly sympathetic to the interests of workers and peasants and focused primarily on the role of the state in economic development. "Social actors" is an amorphous term not necessarily incompatible with the concept of class. Its main task in this context is to avoid asking: are there structural contradictions in capitalist economies, and in whose interests are such economies most likely to operate?

Urbanization and labor migration

State-led, import-substitution industrialization was overwhelmed by massive urban–rural migration. Industrial development could not provide enough employment opportunities for rapidly growing urban populations. Vast shanty-town districts – *gecekondu*s in Turkey, *bidonvilles* and *gourbivilles* in North Africa, *sarifa*s in Iraq, and the medieval cemeteries on the eastern edge of Cairo – overpowered states' distributive capacities, resulting in declining standards of education, housing, health, and sanitation services in urban peripheries.

Algeria, which had virtually no industry before independence, is the most dramatic example of the general trend. From 1954 to 1984 nonagricultural employment increased from 330,000 to 2,555,500. This impres-

sive growth was inadequate to absorb all the new urban job seekers. Unemployment rates remained very high during the expansionary phase of import-substitution industrialization – 22 percent in 1977 and 18 percent in 1984 – and rose to 24 percent in 1990 when state-led development was in serious crisis (Pfeifer 1996: 30).

In Egypt, the most populous Arab country, the nonagricultural wage-labor force grew from just under 4.5 million in 1973 to just over 7 million in 1986, while nonagricultural union membership increased from about 1.5 to 2.5 million. Despite the high rate of urbanization, the average annual increase of membership in industrial and blue-collar service unions in Egypt from 1971 to 1987 was only 3.2 percent – the lowest rate of growth in all the sections of the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions except agriculture (Posusney 1997: 114–15).[2]

A high proportion of new urban dwellers as well as many veterans engaged in services, small manufacturing, and petty commerce – activities often designated as the "informal sector" of the economy. This category, nearly impervious to statistical measure, obscures considerable unemployment, underemployment, unpaid labor of women and children, and irregular financial transactions. Workers in the informal sector rarely joined trade unions. They became part of an urban mass that expressed its disapproval of open-door economic policies by refraining from political participation, collaborating with the black market and other activities that undermined official economic policies, and, *in extremis*, joining in urban riots.

Unemployment, low wages, and lack of access to agricultural land impelled workers and peasants to migrate in search of work. The number of North Africans seeking work in France rose sharply after 1947. Turkish workers began migrating, primarily to Germany, during the European economic expansion of the 1960s (see table 6.1). The recessions of 1974–75 and 1980–82 reduced the demand for Turkish workers. Nonetheless, by 1983 there were over 2.1 million Turks, 4.5 percent of the population, in Europe (European Trade Union Institute 1988: 22). Turkish labor migration to Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries in the 1980s partially offset the decline in migration to Europe.

Rapid population growth and inadequate new job opportunities in non-oil-exporting countries intersected with the huge demand for labor in oil-exporting countries embarking on development projects financed by the explosion of petroleum revenues to produce an unprecedented wave of Arab labor migration. Egypt was the largest Arab labor exporter during the peak of oil-induced migration from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, sending workers primarily to Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iraq (see table 6.2). Perhaps as many as 3.5 million Egyptians, about one-third of

Table 6.1 *Turkish workers placed in positions abroad by the Labor Placement Office*

Year	Number	Estimated annual remittances
1965	51,520	
1969	103,975	$169.2 million
1970	129,575	
1973	135,820	$2,000 million
1974	20,211	$1,425 million
1975	4,419	
1976	10,558	$983 million
1980	28,503	
1988	53,023	
1993	63,244	

Sources: Ahmad 1993: 177; Keyder 1987: 184–87; Turkey. State Institute of Statistics 1973–95

Table 6.2 *Arab Labor Migration*

From	To Saudi Arabia 1975	To other Gulf countries 1975	To Saudi Arabia early 80s	To other Gulf countries early 80s	Total early to mid-1990s
Egypt	95,000	58,745	800,000	1,150,000	2,500,000
Yemen(s)	335,400	25,358	390,000	420,000	1,250,000*
Jordan & Palestine	175,000	70,367	140,000	227,850	over 320,000*

Notes:

* Before the 1991 Gulf War

[1] Sudan is next largest labor exporter

[2] Egypt sent as many as 1,250,000 workers to Iraq during the height of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88)

[3] Libya has imported 250,000–300,000 Egyptian workers annually since the mid-1970s, with some declines due to political crises

Sources: Birks & Sinclair 1980; Owen 1985; Richards & Waterbury 1996; Stevenson 1993; Feiler 1993

the entire labor force, migrated during 1973–85 (Richards & Waterbury 1996: 371). Although the absolute number of migrants was lower, an even higher proportion of Yemenis and Jordanians migrated in search of work. About a quarter of the Jordanian labor force worked abroad, mostly in the Gulf, in the late 1970s; by 1988 the proportion rose to over 37 percent (Layne 1981: 9; Brand 1992: 169). As many as 30 percent of all

Yemeni adult males were abroad at any one time in 1970s and 1980s (Stevenson 1993: 15). In the mid-1980s, when oil-boom-induced labor migration peaked, there were over 5 million migrant Arabs working in the Gulf countries and some 2.5 million North Africans working in Europe (World Bank 1995a: 6). The Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs estimated that migrants comprised 11.6 percent of the total labor force (Radwan et al. 1991: 23–24).

Remittances of migrant workers contributed substantially to alleviating the foreign-currency shortages associated with import-substitution industrialization. Before the expulsion of some 1 million Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia in retaliation for their government's failure to support the US-led assault on Iraq in 1991, remittances comprised as much as 20 percent of the GDP in former North Yemen and 50 percent of the GDP in former South Yemen (Stevenson 1993: 16). In Turkey, remittances offset the cost of 15 percent of all imported capital goods and covered the trade deficit in 1972 and 1974 (Ahmad 1993: 177). Declining remittances after 1974 contributed to the 1978 foreign-exchange crisis that was resolved by imposing neo-liberal policies after the 1980 military coup. Egypt's foreign-exchange shortage was alleviated by increasing labor migration in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1988, when at least 20 percent of the Egyptian labor force was employed abroad, annual official transfers of migrant workers were about $3.2 billion; unofficial transfers were estimated at $2–4 billion (Roy 1991: 552, 579). These transfers comprised the single largest source of foreign exchange and contributed about 12 percent to the GDP in the mid-1980s. In Egypt, as elsewhere, labor migration absorbed a substantial amount of potential unemployment and it provided relatively high incomes to landless peasants who might otherwise have been forced into lives of extreme misery as migrant agricultural laborers (Toth 1999).

The macroeconomic balance sheet of labor migration is mixed (Ibrahim 1982: 551–82; Richards & Waterbury 1996). In Egypt it had a small positive impact on alleviating poverty but a negative effect on income distribution (Adams 1986: 9). Whatever its ultimate contribution to economic growth, labor migration was a substantial factor in the social reformation of the working class and peasantry. The number of agricultural workers declined 10 percent in Egypt from 1975 to 1978, 23 percent in Syria from 1975 to 1979, and 40 percent in Iraq from 1973 to 1977 (many were replaced by Egyptian migrants) (Paul 1981: 4–5; Springborg 1987: 16). The combination of rapid urbanization, the declining role of agriculture in national economies, high levels of unemployment and underemployment, and the possibilities of labor migration made organizing workers and peasants as a social and political force extremely difficult.

The continuity and effectiveness of communities and institutions and traditions of collective action that might have facilitated such organization were undermined.

Women in the wage-labor force

Turkey, Egypt, and to a lesser extent other regimes pursuing import-substitution industrialization mobilized women for national economic development by adopting forms of state-sponsored feminism. Inconstant commitment of the regimes and inadequate job opportunities produced only limited successes in drawing women into the wage-labor force. By the late 1970s and mid-1980s female wage-labor-force participation was 3.3 percent in Jordan, 4.4 percent in Algeria, 6.2 percent in Egypt, 13.3 percent in Tunisia, and 21.9 percent in Turkey. The proportion of females in production work was even lower, ranging from 1 percent in Jordan to 17 percent in Tunisia and a high of 23 percent in Morocco. In 1984–85 only 5.8 percent of economically active women in Egypt and 7.6 percent in Turkey worked in manufacturing, compared to 16.8 percent in Mexico and 25.8 percent in South Korea. A very substantial proportion of economically active women worked as unpaid family workers, most commonly in agriculture – 36.3 percent in Egypt and 67.7 percent in Turkey (Moghadam 1993: 40, 44).

In Egypt the Nasirist regime legislated equal education and wages for women and guaranteed jobs to all high school and university graduates; these rights were expanded in the al-Sadat era. Many working-class and lower-middle-class men and women benefited from these policies. The state became the largest employer of women, typically as clerical workers in the state apparatus or public-sector firms (Hoodfar 1991: 108). Though it was economically necessary, many such women were conflicted about the propriety of working outside the home. Some expressed their ambivalence by donning the "new veil," although they did not necessarily become Islamic political activists or more pious than women in similar circumstances who did not veil (Macleod 1991).

Some Islamist groups advocated removing women from the wage-labor force as a solution to male unemployment. Their arguments did not prevent women from seeking employment when jobs and a supportive political environment were available. State intervention and the availability of suitable work were more powerful factors in shaping women's employment opportunities than interpretations of the requirements of Islamic tradition (Hammam 1977; Quataert 1991; Moghadam 1993: 65; Khater 1996: 325–48). However, it is likely that, at least for a certain period, ambivalence about working outside the home inhibited some

women's identification with their workplaces and limited their participation in trade unions and work-related collective action.

Sectoral labor shortages created by migration were often filled by women. In Jordan, where the number of women in the wage-labor force was relatively low, 14.4 percent of employees in establishments with five or more employees were women in 1976; only a year later the proportion rose to 18.1 percent. They were concentrated in public administration, communication, education, clerical work, administration, and finance. Most of the very small number of women who worked in manufacturing establishments were employed in the textile sector. Their numbers increased somewhat after the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty due to subcontracting by Israeli textile firms (Salfiti 1997). Women commonly worked for piece rates and were subjected to patriarchal and other extra-economic control mechanisms. Only 23 percent of the women in a sample surveyed in 1977 were members of trade unions (Layne 1981: 20–22).

Labor migration brought many peasant women to undertake work formerly done by their husbands or brothers. Studies of two Egyptian villages come to divergent conclusions about the consequences. Fatma Khafagy believes that women were empowered by assuming new responsibilities when their male relatives were absent (Khafagy 1984). Elizabeth Taylor argues that there was no permanent shift in patriarchal family structure because men imposed the previous forms of gender relations, or even more conservative ones they learned in the Gulf, when they returned (Taylor 1984). Research conducted about the same time on a very small sample but based on observed behavior rather than interviews concludes that wives of migrating husbands who lived in nuclear families – but not women living in extended families – did have greater autonomy (Brink 1991: 206).

Male migration and economic necessity brought more women into the wage-labor force in the 1970s and 1980s. But the rate of female wage-labor-force participation remained low compared to Asia and Latin America. Many women were conflicted about working outside the home, and most remained on the margins of the wage-labor force, entering and leaving according to their family circumstances. Wage labor increased women's autonomy in certain circumstances, but was not a liberatory panacea.

Structural adjustment, urban collective action, and state repression

Because national trade union and peasant federations were subordinated to ruling parties and state apparatuses, most political scientists consider workers and peasants to be insignificant in determining economic and

social policy (Waterbury 1983). Others argue that labor is a significant social and political force but focus their attention on the bargain between the leaders of national trade union federations and the state (Bianchi 1986; Bianchi 1989; Alexander 1996a; Posusney 1997). This orientation leads most political scientists to ignore the significance of collective actions of local union leaders or ordinary workers.[3] Reliable information about such actions is difficult to obtain because the mass media and political action are subject to various degrees of control. Leaders of wildcat strikes and illegal collective actions are more difficult to locate and more reluctant to speak to researchers about their motives and organizational activities than trade union and government officials. The following three case studies of urban collective action have been selected because Tunisia, Turkey, and even Egypt to a certain extent were considered IMF "success stories," while Egypt is one of the most important long-term sites of remedial Washington consensus policies (Pfeifer 1999). The cases demonstrate the social costs of this success as well as the sustained efforts of national trade union federations, local union officials, rank-and-file workers, and heterogenous urban crowds to resist the imposition of neo-liberal policies and the political order that accompanied them. Such resistance – or often simply regimes' fears of potential resistance – altered the timing and extent to which neo-liberal programs were implemented. This affirms the continuing effect of subaltern presence in the post-Fordist era. Against a global discourse hailing the end of history and proclaiming that "there is no alternative," urban protest was incapable of reversing the trend or articulating a comprehensive new policy.

Tunisia: a new corporatist bargain

Rivalries within the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail were among the causes of Tunisia's abandonment of its socialist experiment in 1969. The corporatist bargain between the UGTT and employers imposed by the government in 1972 did not stick because it was made by Habib Achour and other UGTT leaders loyal to President Bourguiba. Unions of teachers, bank employees, university professors, engineers, and other educated and higher paid white-collar workers – Ahmad Ben Salah's base of support within the UGTT – began a sustained campaign of resistance to the new economic policies as soon as their economic impact was manifested. Some of the white-collar union activists had been radical students in the 1960s; others had ties to the Communist Party. Achour tried to purge these elements from the national leadership of the UGTT by eliminating the representatives of the teachers and the post, telegraph, and telephone workers' unions (Alexander 1996a: 179).

Table 6.3 *Strikes in Tunisia, 1970–77*

1970:	25
1971:	32
1972:	150
1973:	215
1974:	141
1975:	377
1976:	369
1977:	452
TOTAL:	1,761

Source: Alexander 1996a: 160

The central issue for labor in the 1970s was the rising cost of living. The UGTT estimated that consumer prices increased 36 percent from 1970 to 1977 while the average real wage increased only 18 percent from 1971 to 1975. White-collar workers led many of the wildcat strikes unauthorized by the UGTT central leadership throughout the 1970s (see table 6.3) (Alexander 1996a: 158–62). In 1977 the UGTT and the government concluded a social pact to which neither was fully committed. Wildcat strikes against the pact broke out, and Habib Achour defended the strikers. Rank-and-file unionists pressed the UGTT to declare a general strike against the cost-of-living increases. Achour announced his open opposition to the regime by resigning from the leadership bodies of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD). A highly successful general strike was held on January 26, 1978, accompanied by rioting of the urban poor. At least one hundred people were killed in clashes with security forces that day. In response, the government jailed Habib Achour and other UGTT leaders and imposed a new executive committee on the union. But the strikes continued (Vandewalle 1988: 607–8).

The government of Muhammad Mzali (1980–86) sought to avoid conflict with the UGTT. But in the fall of 1983 an IMF mission visited and convinced the government to adopt its recommendations to lower the budget deficit by cutting subsidies on consumer products. The cuts were announced on December 29, raising the price of bread, pasta, and semolina by 70 percent. In response, rioting began in Gafsa and other southern cities and then spread to Tunis in early January. More than a hundred people died in clashes with security forces before the price increases were rescinded.

In late 1985 the government began a new campaign of repression against the UGTT. Habib Achour was again placed under house arrest,

and the union's offices were occupied by PSD militias. During 1986 most of the UGTT leadership was imprisoned, giving the government more room for maneuver in facing its foreign-exchange crisis. The government resolved the crisis by accepting an IMF standby credit of $180 million in exchange for adopting the standard Washington consensus stabilization policy package: devaluation of the dinar, government budget cuts, liberalization of the trade regime, and a commitment to privatize public-sector enterprises.

The first priority of the new regime established by the coup d'état of Zayn al-ʿAbidin Ben ʿAli on November 7, 1987 was to implement the IMF stabilization plan. In response, there were 2,586 strikes during the next six years, far more than the 1,761 in the seven years preceding the general strike of January 26, 1978. Most were conducted without the approval of the UGTT central committee. Despite the repressive measures of 1985–86 and the active intervention of the Ben ʿAli regime in its internal affairs, UGTT members demonstrated considerable continuing capacity for collective action. The regime faced the choice of breaking the union or enticing it into a new alliance.

The rise of the Islamic Tendency Movement and its successor, al-Nahda, as the strongest opponents of the regime in the mid-1980s tilted the balance towards the option of a renewed corporatist bargain between the regime and the union. Ben ʿAli intervened heavily in the "renewal" of the UGTT to strengthen its secularist elements. The fight against political Islam created pressures for a new state–union alliance in which strikes over wages and working conditions became rare, and there was no longer a contest over fundamental economic policy. The UGTT embarked on a new era of collaborative relations with the government and the federation of employers. In 1992 secretary general Ismaʿil Sahbani, who had been installed at the 1989 national congress consecrating the government-supervised "rehabilitation" of the UGTT, declared: "Our union . . . is trying to adapt to changes in the international economic system, the structural adjustment program, the new world order, and the market economy" (Alexander 1996b: 177).

Egypt: an inconclusive outcome

President Anwar al-Sadat officially introduced Egypt's open-door policy after the crossing of the Suez Canal in the 1973 war legitimized his regime. The first protests against the new course erupted dramatically and unexpectedly with no organized support from trade union or leftist political leaders. On January 1, 1975 workers commuting to the southern Cairo industrial suburb of Helwan occupied the Bab al-Luq railway

station while others sat in at the iron and steel mill in Helwan. At the other end of metropolitan Cairo, textile workers in Shubra al-Khayma proclaimed a solidarity strike, and several mills were occupied. In addition to economic demands, workers in these actions raised political slogans, including a call for the prime minister to resign. There were other strikes and collective actions over economic issues during 1975–76 in Cairo, al-Mahalla al-Kubra, Helwan, Alexandria, Tanta, Nagʿ Hammadi, and Port Said (Baklanoff 1988; ʿAdli 1993: 268; Beinin 1994a). The strike and protest movement was concentrated among workers in large public-sector enterprises, who had been major beneficiaries of Nasirist statist development.

Egypt's turn towards the West and continuing foreign-exchange crisis gave the IMF an opening to propose far-reaching economic policy changes. The government adopted the recommendations of a fall 1976 IMF mission to cut subsidies on bread, sugar, tea, and other basic consumer goods, announcing price increases of 25–50 percent. Urban crowds immediately responded with explosive demonstrations and riots on January 18–19, 1977 – the largest and most forceful popular collective actions since the Cairo fire of January 26, 1952. The protests were concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria but spread throughout the country, threatening to topple the regime. Factory workers initiated and played a prominent role in these actions. They were joined by students, the unemployed, and others in urban crowds. Peasants were not prominent in the events.

While President al-Sadat portrayed himself as a great liberal opposed to the undemocratic measures of the Nasirist regime, a chilly and repressive climate descended upon Egypt from the 1977 riots until al-Sadat's assassination by radical Islamists in 1981. The regime claimed that communists and other leftists incited the riots. In fact, the legal and illegal left were surprised by the extent of popular anger and its insurrectionary character (Beinin 1994a). Nonetheless, many suspected communists were put on trial. The intellectual Marxist monthly *al-Taliʿa* (The Vanguard), which dared to explain that though it did not endorse the violence, the anger of the masses was justified, was closed. *Al-Ahali* (The People), the weekly of the legal leftist Tagammuʿ Party, was intermittently proscribed. Law 3 of 1977, a direct response to the riots, allowed the government to punish strikers with imprisonment and hard labor.

Many workers in large public enterprises did have a Nasirist or Marxist-inspired understanding of their situation. Public-sector workers were sometimes quite militant in opposing the open-door policy in the 1970s and 1980s, usually without support from the official trade union leadership. Other elements of the urban crowds in January 1977 were

moved by Islamic sentiment, which was expressed by the trashing of the casinos on Pyramids Road, long identified by the Muslim Brothers as symbols of foreign-influenced, moral dissolution. Many skilled and experienced workers, as well as unskilled workers and peasants, migrated to the oil-exporting countries, thus absenting themselves from the struggle over the open-door policy. Those in the vast "informal sector" were largely quiescent and difficult, if not impossible, to organize. Moreover, years of Nasirist repression of the left, the dissolution of the two communist parties in 1964, subsequent efforts of the leftist intelligentsia to collaborate with the regime, and wishful assessments of the character of the early al-Sadat regime by these same intellectuals meant there was no effective oppositional discourse articulating a political program for workers and their potential allies.

Husni Mubarak began his presidency in 1981 by alleviating the repressive measures of the al-Sadat regime. He ordered the 1,300 political prisoners arrested without charges on the eve of al-Sadat's assassination released. The press and opposition political parties were given more leeway, and an electoral alliance of the Muslim Brothers and the Wafd was permitted to participate in the 1984 parliamentary elections. A more stable and ideologically compatible Muslim Brothers–Labor Party (LP) electoral alliance was formed in 1987.

After their success in the 1987 national parliamentary elections, the Brothers–LP alliance participated in national trade union elections for the first time. The Islamic Current (al-Tayyar al-Islami), as the Muslim Brothers and their supporters are known, won control of several professional associations (Wickham 1996). But their gains in the trade unions were modest. Nonetheless, the Islamic Current established itself, along with the left, as a political tendency opposed to the state and the ruling party in the labor movement.

The relatively less repressive atmosphere of the early Mubarak era permitted a significant increase in strikes and other workers' collective action. Some fifty to seventy-five actions a year were reported in the Egyptian press during 1984–89 (El Shafei 1995:36). Due to censorship and lack of media interest, this is surely not a comprehensive tally. The left was an active and sometimes a leading component in struggles involving major confrontations with the state, such as the massive strike and uprising of textile workers in Kafr al-Dawwar in September–October 1984, the strike at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in February 1985, the railway workers strike of July 1986, and the two sit-in strikes at the Iron and Steel Company in July and August 1989.

Opposition forces made some headway in winning control of enterprise-level trade union committees in the elections of 1991 and 1996. But

they could not break the regime's control of the GFETU at the national level. Nonetheless, both shop-floor and enterprise-level militant actions and the bureaucratic maneuvers of the GFETU leaders were a major factor delaying the full implementation of the neo-liberal economic program. Mubarak irked the IMF, the World Bank, and international financial interests by resisting their calls to further reduce consumer subsidies, unify foreign-exchange rates, and privatize the public sector until after the 1991 Gulf War.

Cancelation of half of Egypt's foreign debt as a reward for participation in the Gulf War prepared the way for a new agreement with the IMF in May 1991. Subsequently, as foreign reserves and other macroeconomic indicators improved, the Mubarak government finally began to privatize state-owned enterprises in earnest. To encourage privatization, in 1995 the regime drafted a new Unified Labor Law that proposed to reorganize the national labor federation, eliminate the job security gained by public-sector workers in the Nasir era, and set stringent conditions for legal strikes. Reorganization of the trade union movement had long been resisted by the GFETU as well as by both the left and the Islamic Current because they feared it would diminish workers' rights and enhance the state's repressive capacity. After much hesitation, the GFETU leadership embraced the proposed labor legislation, hoping that it would reinforce their control over rank-and-file union members who had become alienated as a consequence of the labor federation's weakness in defending their interests. Nonetheless, resistance by rank-and-file workers and lower-level union officials supported by both the left and the Islamic Current blocked enactment of the legislation throughout the 1990s.

Turkey: class struggle and bourgeois victory

Turkish import-substitution industrialization development collapsed after 1973. Increased costs of imported oil, declining remittances from workers in Europe, and reduced foreign lending and aid after the 1974 invasion of Cyprus contributed to escalating social tensions and political violence. The crisis could not be politically resolved as the Justice Party (JP) and the Republican People's Party (RPP) battled to a stalemate.

The foreign exchange crisis of 1977–79 compelled Bulent Ecevit's RPP government formed in January 1978 to negotiate debt-rescheduling arrangements with creditors under IMF supervision. Ecevit imposed austerity measures severe enough to cause his supporters in urban areas to defect. Strike action began to increase in 1978 and reached unprecedented proportions in 1980. As many as 500,000 people participated in

DİSK's May Day demonstrations in Istanbul in 1976, 1977, and 1978. The 1979 demonstration was banned by martial law, a harbinger of the more systematic repression that was to follow (Margulies & Yıldızoğlu 1984: 18).

The RPP defeat in the October 1979 senate elections brought Süleyman Demirel and the JP to power. On January 24, 1980 Demirel's economic advisor, Turgut Özal, announced his IMF-approved austerity plan devaluing the Turkish lira by over 30 percent (on top of the 43 percent devaluation previously imposed by Ecevit) and raising consumer prices by about 70 percent. Özal was aware that political pressures might not allow him to implement his plan. Political violence and strikes provided the pretext for the military coup of September 12, 1980.

The junta banned DİSK and arrested hundreds of trade union leaders. Türk İş was permitted to continue functioning. But strikes were outlawed, and an arbitration board was established to settle wage disputes. The 1983 Labor Code institutionalized labor's subordination to capital. Both the political left and the right were smashed, as the junta strove to depoliticize Turkish society. In January 1981, a European Economic Community committee estimated that there were 30,000 political detainees, many of whom were subjected to torture. With all organized opposition broken, Özal convinced the junta to allow him to implement his economic plan without political interference (Ahmad 1993: 177–83).

Workers paid a heavy price for Turkey's status as a Washington consensus success story in the mid-1980s. As the military regime eased its repression, they moved to recover the losses of the early 1980s. From 1987 to 1991 the average number of strikes per year was higher than the previous peak year of 1980 (see table 6.4). Even the significant wage increases in the collective-bargaining agreements of 1989–91 did not make up for the wage erosion of the previous period (Yeldan 1994: 77, 80–81).

The debt crisis set off by the oil-price spike of 1973–74 and the global recession of the mid-1970s set the international context for Özal's imposition of Washington consensus, neo-liberal economic prescriptions. The intense social conflict of the 1970s was the local impetus for the military coup that consolidated Özal's ascendancy and ultimately his electoral victory as leader of the Motherland Party in 1983. That social conflict is not solely an expression of class struggle. It also involved an adventurist student-based new left, a broad challenge to Kemalist secularism by Islamists, an upsurge of Kurdish ethnic sentiment and the right-wing effort to repress it, sectarian contention between sunnis and Alevis, and other social cleavages, all exacerbated by the personal rivalry between Demirel and Ecevit. Moreover, the working class was not unified.

Table 6.4 *Strikes in Turkey, 1963–94*

Year	Strikes	Strikers	Days lost
1963	8	1,514	19,739
1964	**83**	6,640	238,161
1965	**46**	6,593	366,836
1966	**42**	11,414	430,104
1967	**100**	9,463	344,112
1968	**54**	5,179	175,286
1969	**86**	20,155	323,220
1970	**72**	21,150	220,189
1971	**78**	10,916	476,116
1972	**48**	14,879	659,362
1973	**55**	12,256	671,135
1974	110	36,628	1,109,401
1975	116	13,708	668,797
1976	**58**	7,240	325,830
1977	**59**	15,628	1,397,124
1978	**87**	9,748	426,127
1979	176	24,920	1,432,078
1980	220	33,832	4,298,413
1987	307	29,734	1,961,940
1988	156	30,057	1,085,057
1989	171	39,435	190,755
1990	458	166,306	1,188,091
1991	398	164,968	1,188,719
1992	**98**	62,189	158,545
1993	**49**	6,908	286,789
1994	**36**	4,782	104,869

Source: Margulies & Yıldızoğlu 1984: 18; Barkey 1990: 102; Turkey. State Institute of Statistics 1973–95

Unionized workers were divided among DISK, which was based mainly in the private sector, Türk İş, based primarily in the public sector, and the much smaller National Action Party-led Confederation of Nationalist Workers' Unions (MİSK) and the Islamist Hak-İş confederations. Only 1.5 million of the 6 million workers covered by social security were unionized in 1980. Other cleavages within the working class included the social adjustment difficulties of migrants returning from Europe in the mid-1970s (Kara 1984). Moreover, the labor movement made little effort to form a political alliance with peasants.

Nonetheless, the increasing politicization of the labor movement, especially private-sector workers organized in DİSK, and the transformation of the RPP into a social democratic party represented a significant threat

to the Turkish business class, much more so than the new left urban guerrilla activity in the early 1970s. Both workers and industrialists benefited from import-substitution industrialization, but the populist guarantees of the 1961 constitution allowed organized workers to fight fiercely to maintain and extend their gains during the post-1973 recessionary period. The mobilization of Turkish workers from the 1960s to the 1980s more closely resembles the Marxian model of class politics than any other Middle Eastern case. Turgut Özal's neo-liberal economic policies and political repression of the labor movement were a clear victory for capital, although the business class was unwilling to fight for it on its own because it had benefited from state-led development and had a long history of political timidity. The consolidation of a bourgeois pole in Turkish politics during the Özal decade was an unanticipated outcome of the collective action of workers and their political allies among the intelligentsia.

The rollback of agrarian reform

The agrarian reform programs enacted from the 1950s to 1970 typically favored middle and rich peasants. None carried out as radical a redistribution as South Korea or Taiwan, which might have provided land for all those who wished to farm (Mitchell 1991a). In Egypt, the guarantee of perpetual tenancy at controlled rents had a more radical effect than land redistribution. Peasants in the Fayyum region interviewed in 1989 strongly supported this aspect of agrarian reform because "before the revolution you could not speak in front of a person who had money. In the past, the peasant would rent a piece of land according to the owner's terms. At any time the owner could kick him out and bring another peasant to farm it . . . There was no justice." They were deeply attached to Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir who "issued the law that said a peasant is not to be thrown out from his field . . . [and] gave life to the peasant" (Saad 1999: 391–92).

State-administered cooperatives and regulation of agricultural inputs and outputs distorted crop prices to the disadvantage of peasants. Technocratic agricultural development policies concentrated on high-visibility capital-intensive infrastructure projects such as the Aswan High Dam and land reclamation, neglecting more mundane but critical issues such as drainage and short-term production growth (Richards 1980; Pfeifer 1985; Radwan et al. 1991: 30). Import-substitution industrialization tends to disregard agriculture and peasants, and this was exacerbated during the oil boom. These problems, along with increased social power of landowners and support of the Washington consensus, generated pressures to roll back agrarian reform and encourage large-scale capitalist farming.

Large landowners, an important base of support for the PSD, rebelled against the belated inclusion of their farms in the Tunisian cooperative program in 1969. Less than nine months after large holdings were incorporated into the cooperatives, the lands were returned to their former owners. The cooperatives were gradually abandoned and their lands privatized over the next few years after the World Bank and the US government turned against the program (King 1997: 118, 128). Direct investment by the state was replaced by credit and subsidies to individual owners in order to promote capitalist agriculture. These policies increased agricultural production and average agricultural income, though part of this improvement was due to previous public investments. However, the Tunisian government's privatization policies did not create rational, profit-maximizing peasants. Instead, they encouraged the revival of patronage and kinship networks and a moral economy drawing on Islamic norms and practices: a system of social controls tying the poor to the rich and to the state via bureaucratic and traditional welfare mechanisms.

Tunisian small peasants bore a disproportionate share of the costs of agrarian policy from 1970 on. Structural adjustment did not create new rural jobs. It accelerated rural–urban migration and the concentration of poverty in urban migrant zones. Poor farmers producing rain-fed crops did not benefit from the new agricultural price policies. Land holdings became increasingly concentrated. Although medium owners are the most efficient producers, the state consistently favored large landowners. The most intensive examination of peasant responses to the rollback of agrarian reform and the promotion of capitalist agribusiness concludes that "structural adjustment has stabilized the dominance of the agrarian upper class" (King 1997: 136).[4]

The Egyptian case is similar, although on a much larger scale. The al-Sadat regime undermined the power of agricultural cooperatives and pro-tenant agrarian relations dispute committees soon after coming to power. Holdings of large landowners that had not been redistributed were desequestered in 1971. Many expropriated landlords successfully sued to regain their lands. In 1975, agricultural rents, frozen since 1952, were raised and owners were given increased powers to evict tenants. In 1981 the ceiling on private ownership of land was raised to 200 *faddan*s for reclaimed land and was effectively abolished for corporations. A tendency towards reconcentration of agricultural land was apparent by 1982 ('Abd al-Mu'ti & Kishk 1992: 216–17).

The Mubarak regime went even further in dismantling agrarian reform and meeting the demands of landlords. In 1986, price controls were lifted on most crops except cotton and sugarcane. The government encouraged

cultivation of cash crops for export rather than food staples. The centerpiece of the new pro-landlord orientation was proposed legislation to decontrol agricultural rents and abolish peasants' permanent tenancy rights. Discussions began on the draft law in 1985, though fear of peasant reactions delayed enactment of the measure until 1992. The legislation raised agricultural rents from seven to twenty-two times the land tax until October 1997 and eliminated rent ceilings entirely thereafter. It also gave landlords the right to evict tenants without cause after October 1997 and to sell their lands at market value (Hinnebusch 1993; Saad 1999).

In the summer of 1997 peasants in Bani Suwayf, Minya, Fayyum, Asyut, and Suhag provinces in upper Egypt and the Delta village of al-'Attaf, supported by Islamist, Nasirist, and leftist political parties, protested and rioted in anticipation of the removal of rent ceilings and massive evictions of tenants. Agricultural cooperative offices were torched, at least one landlord was killed, and peasants opened fire on security forces. Fourteen people were killed, dozens wounded, and hundreds arrested (*Al Ahram Weekly* 1997: July 10–16, August 28–September 3, September 25–October 1). Nonetheless, the law was implemented on schedule.

There was a loud debate in the press in the late 1980s over the proposed decontrol of agricultural rents. But peasants had no vehicle to voice their opinions. The national press delegitimized peasant tenants, accusing them of laziness and overbearing behavior towards landowners. Rather than an expression of democratization, media discussion of the draft law demonstrated the limited channels for substantive political debate and the exclusion of peasants from the political process (Springborg 1991; Saad 1999).

Iraq is probably the most idiosyncratic case of rolling back agrarian reform because the policy cannot be attributed to either pressure from international financial institutions or a domestic class of aspiring capitalists. Policies dismantling collective farms and cooperatives, encouraging private ownership of land, and directing credit away from agricultural cooperatives were introduced in 1979. Ceilings on agricultural land holdings ceased to be strictly enforced. Controls over the cropping patterns of recipients of agrarian reform land were relaxed. In 1987, state agricultural holdings began to be sold. Crops and livestock produced by private owners using large-scale, modern, capital-intensive methods increased significantly. Wealthy urban dwellers enhanced their investment in capitalist agriculture in irrigated areas near the large cities. Although private agriculture grew rapidly in the 1980s, a new class of capitalist farmers was not consolidated before the Gulf War (Springborg 1986). There was no democratization, no development of civil society, and no marketization of the economy to any extent that the regime could not easily reverse.

Results and prospects

Even before the adoption of open-door policies, states had already sharply limited the autonomy of trade unions and peasant organizations, particularly their radical elements. The imposition of Washington consensus policies was accompanied by significant further repression and a decline in political freedom. In Turkey and Tunisia, the implementation of these policies was preceded by military coups. In Egypt, a limited democratic opening accompanied the new policies. But when the going got rough, the regime cracked down hard. Trade unionists and political leaders who opposed the new policies, whether through enterprise-level actions or national political mobilization, were repressed. Democratic openings, where they occurred, did not include the legalization of communist or Islamist parties (with the partial exception of the Welfare Party and its successor, the Virtue Party, in Turkey). The right to strike was usually limited.

Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia recovered from the balance-of-payments crises that had prompted the imposition of Washington consensus policies. In Tunisia and Turkey, the combination of state repression, renewed social spending, and the threat of political Islam led to new corporatist bargains between the trade unions and the state, although with workers in a weaker position than in the previous era. Efforts to negotiate such a bargain began in Egypt, but did not come to fruition by the end of the 1990s, perhaps because of the relative weakness of the Egyptian labor movement. The two waves of Egyptian workers' collective action in resistance to open-door policies – 1975–77 and 1984–89 – were much less substantial than the strike waves in Tunisia in the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s or Turkey in the early and late 1970s, late 1980s, and early 1990s. Unlike the Turkish case, the most radical actions in Egypt were concentrated in the public sector, not the growing private sector (El Shafei 1995: 36).

The riots of January 1977 in Egypt and January 1984 in Tunisia exemplify a new form of urban social protest that became common in the era of economic policy shifts inspired by the Washington consensus: "IMF food riots." Other examples include Morocco (1981), Sudan (1985), and Jordan (1989 and 1996). The October 1988 riots in Algeria were not a direct response to an IMF-imposed program, but both the policies they opposed and the social character of the urban revolt were comparable to the new model (Pfeifer 1992). The Tunisian general strike of January 26, 1978 and the September–October 1984 strike and riot at the Kafr al-Dawwar textile mills in Egypt are mixed cases: traditional labor actions commingled with the violence of urban crowds directed broadly against the state and its symbols of authority.

The diffuse and sporadic character of these protests – spontaneous rioting or localized labor strikes rather than a sustained campaign of political and economic action – is partly the result of the structural and ideological heterogeneity of urban workers and the delegitimization of left politics in the open-door era. Collective action of unionized workers, even when well organized, radical, and militant, was only one component of popular protest against the Washington consensus. Workers were not able to organize a counter-hegemonic bloc of forces around themselves. Therefore, their collective actions could delay or modify the implementation of Washington consensus policies, but could not block them or advance an alternative economic course.

Islamist forces attempted to profit by the decline of the left, forming rival trade union federations in Turkey and Algeria and contesting elections in the state-authorized trade union federations in Egypt and Tunisia. But they failed to replace the left as the principal advocates of workers in large-scale modern enterprises (Alexander 1996a: 344, 374–78; Alexander 1996b; Willis 1996: 178; Djabi 1997; Beinin 1998b). Unionized urban workers are one of the social groups least attracted to movements of political Islam that have inspired resistance to capitalist globalization in the Middle East and beyond.

Democracy did not do well in the era of neo-liberal ascendency. Over and above the coup that brought Zayn al-ʿAbidin Ben ʿAli to power in 1987, Tunisia became more authoritarian after the wave of rural economic reorganization began in 1990 (King 1997). The Islamist al-Nahda remained illegal; there were repeated reports of the regime's detention and torture of political opponents; and no real opposition parties participated in the 1994 elections. After July 1992, the Egyptian regime imposed a broad political deliberalization in response to the challenge of armed Islamist groups and opposition to the new economic policies (Kienle 1998). The penal code was revised to replace prison terms with forced labor. Security cases were routinely transferred to military courts with less independence than civil courts. At least 10,000 political detainees were arrested under the state's emergency powers; many were tortured. In May 1995 a new law was enacted sharply restricting freedom of the press. It was abrogated after intense protest by journalists in 1996. Nonetheless, in 1998 two journalists were jailed for writing articles unflattering to a former cabinet minister. The parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1995 were significantly less free than previous elections and resulted in greater majorities for the ruling National Democratic Party than before.

While workers resisted Washington consensus policies to varying degrees, peasants were less engaged. In part this was due to the migration

of large numbers of landless peasants to the cities or abroad. Peasant family farms were economically and politically marginalized, further reducing the capacity of peasants for collective action. Rural areas and provincial towns provided important bases for armed Islamic insurgents in Egypt (Fandy 1994). But the activists were typically not peasants. In Tunisia, poor peasants' protest against the inequities of structural adjustment was contained by agrarian relations promoting a revival of a moral economy – a form of state-led Islamization whose unintended consequence was that peasants became more amenable to the discourse of the regime's Islamist opposition. Small peasants were losers from Washington consensus policies in part because they had no voice in their formulation or implementation. Peasants were not part of a ruling coalition undertaking structural adjustment in any Middle Eastern country (Waterbury 1989: 42).

Regardless of the degree of macroeconomic success or failure of Washington consensus policies, one clear consequence was the redistribution of national income away from workers and peasant farmers towards self-employed individuals and corporations. Statistics on such matters are more than usually unreliable, but the overall trend is clear. In the early 1990s real wages in manufacturing in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia were at or below their 1970 level (World Bank 1995a: 4).

In Tunisia, incomes of self-employed individuals increased 68 percent during 1970–77, after Arab socialist policies were abandoned, while profits increased over 115 percent. Income distribution grew more unequal from 1975 to 1986 as the richest 20 percent of the population increased its share of total consumption from 22 percent to 50 percent while the share of the poorest 20 percent stagnated at 5–6 percent (Alexander 1996a: 162; Pfeifer 1996: 46; Radwan et al. 1991: 49–52, 61–62).

In Egypt, real wages in the private sector rose over 50 percent from 1975 to 1985, while public-sector wages rose by more than a third. By 1990 wages had fallen to their 1972 level, and they continued to decline during the early 1990s (Soliman 1998: 36). Real wages in manufacturing, which rose nearly 50 percent from 1975 to 1982, fell 40 percent from 1985 to 1995 (Hansen 1991: 473; Kienle 1998: 233). Income distribution worsened. From 1981–82 to 1990–91 the Gini coefficient of inequality (for a definition see page 39) rose from 0.32 to 0.38 in the urban sector and 0.29 to 0.32 in rural areas. The biggest losers in this period were the middle 40 percent of households, followed by the lowest 30 percent (Korayem 1995/96: 25–26).

The Turkish statistics seem the most complete and reliable. In the

decade following implementation of Washington consensus policies in 1980, real wages in the public sector declined by 39 percent and civil service wages declined 13.5 percent. Real wages in the private sector increased by 16.6 percent. The last figure suggests an apparent success for the new economic policies, but must be judged in the context of increasingly unequal income distribution as expressed by the decline of the popular factor shares in the national income. From 1980 to 1988 the share of agriculture in the national income declined from 26.66 percent to 13.20 percent; wages and salaries, which rose steadily as a percentage of national income from 1963 to 1978, declined from 23.87 percent to 15.8 percent; rents, profits, and interest increased from 49.47 percent to 71 percent (Yeşilada & Fısunoğlu 1992: 199–200; Waterbury 1992: 66). Declining real wages in manufacturing was the main factor that enhanced the competitiveness of Turkey's manufactured exports in the 1980s, the primary basis for neo-liberal claims to success (Hansen 1991: 415–18).

By the mid-1990s, Washington consensus policies were unable to create sufficient jobs anywhere in the Middle East to employ those excluded from the shrinking public sector or displaced from agriculture by mechanization and reconcentration of plots. Unemployment rates were higher than anywhere else in the world: about 10 percent in Turkey (down considerably from 25 percent in 1986); 15 percent in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia; 20–25 percent in Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen; and about 20 percent in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, frequently exacerbated by Israel's closure of the territories (World Bank 1995a: 2; Richards & Waterbury 1996: 134).

Although low by international standards, poverty was not generally alleviated by Washington consensus policies. In Egypt the segment of the population under the poverty line ($30 a month) rose 30 percent from 1985 to 1990. During the same period poverty tripled in Jordan (World Bank 1995a: 3–5). Egyptian household income data indicate that in 1990–91 urban poverty was one-and-a-half times the level of 1980–81, while rural poverty more than doubled. Calculations based on household expenditure data yielded an increase of 20 percent in rural poverty and 84 percent in urban poverty over the same period (Korayem 1995/96: 22).

Quite exceptionally, the World Bank believes that in Morocco and Tunisia, poverty levels were reduced by nearly half (World Bank 1995a: 3–5). Samir Radwan disputes the bank's methods for defining the poverty line and argues that in Tunisia between 1975 and 1985 poverty decreased by only one-fifth and 23 percent of all wage earners lived in poverty. Moreover, there was no trickle-down in rural areas where families owned few productive resources. The alleviation of poverty in the face of worsening income distribution in Tunisia was largely due to remittances of

migrant workers, not the internal capacity of the economy to generate well-paying jobs. In other words, the structural transformation of the economy was not self-sustaining (Radwan et al. 1991: 52–61, 89).

Washington consensus policies were certainly not the only cause of declining wages, high unemployment, and poverty. The collapse of oil prices and the return of migrant workers in the mid-1980s, the 1991 Gulf War, and the slowdown in the European and Japanese economies all played a role. These conjunctural factors intersected with the stagnation of the public sector and the inability of the private sector to provide a significant number of new high-wage manufacturing jobs.

By 1995 the World Bank had become so concerned about this state of affairs that it issued a special report asking *Will Arab Workers Prosper or be Left out in the Twenty-first Century?* The report made obligatory obeisance to the primacy of markets but also argued that laissez-faire policies were inadequate to set minimum standards for wages, working conditions, and collective bargaining and to reduce income insecurity. The bank called for a "broad vision of a new social contract that is realistic and capable of benefiting most workers" (World Bank 1995a: v). It is too soon to judge the extent to which the World Bank's change of leadership and tone might effect the generally more anti-popular orientation of the IMF and the US government. The World Bank's defection from neo-liberal orthodoxy and, much more significantly, the upsurge of popular struggle against Washington consensus policies at the turn of the twenty-first century suggest that the nearly unchallenged ascendancy of the ideology of unfettered markets and private enterprise is the product of a specific and limited historical conjuncture.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 Baer and Porath represent a distinctive Israeli style of Middle East social history. Because Israeli scholars did not have access to any place in the Arab world except Palestine from 1948 to 1979, their social histories tend to be more textualist than others. This unavoidable limitation is exacerbated by the dominance of traditional Orientalism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the institutional home of both Baer and Porath.

2 The comparative value of the work of the Subaltern Studies school was examined in a special issue of *The American Historical Review* with articles by Prakash (1994) on the original India-based project, Mallon (1994) on Latin America, and Cooper (1994) on Africa. The absence of an article on the Middle East reflects both the weakness of subaltern studies approaches in Middle East studies and the view of many American historians (and others) that the Middle East is too unimportant, too exceptional, or too contentious to be of general interest.

3 Some Ottomanists argue that the *çift–hane* system actually prevailed in practice, though this claim has not been empirically demonstrated.

4 McGowan (1981: 47) illustrates specific numbers of retainers and types of equipment.

5 A special issue of the *Journal of Peasant Studies* 18 (nos. 3–4, April/July 1991), entitled "New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History," is devoted to this effort.

6 Many recent studies do take into account political economy, historical change, and the role of the state. For Egypt see Saad 1988; Saad 1998; El-Karanshawy 1998; Adams 1991; Hopkins 1993; for Jordan and Palestine Mundy 1994; Moors 1995; Tamari & Giacaman 1997; and for Lebanon Gilsenan 1996. Mitchell (forthcoming) contains many detailed and insightful studies of village life in upper Egypt including an updated version of his expose of Richard Critchfield that has broad conceptual value.

7 Two exceptions are Vallet 1911 and al-Khuli 1987–92. The second is discussed extensively in chapter 4.

1 THE WORLD CAPITALIST MARKET, PROVINCIAL REGIMES, AND LOCAL PRODUCERS, 1750–1839

1 Faruk Tabak speculates that the expansion of agricultural production in the second half of the eighteenth century led to intensification of peasant labor

due to increased cultivation of summer crops such as tomatoes, potatoes, haricot beans, tobacco, cochineal, and the reintroduction of sugarcane around Sidon and Beirut (Tabak 1991: 145–46). But he does not make a strong case for this claim, and even if it is true to some extent, rising peasant incomes would have partially compensated for working longer hours.

2 Basing himself on Cuno's first published article, Gerber maintains that "from the beginning of the seventeenth century the status of the peasant declined rapidly" (Cuno 1980; Gerber 1987: 65). Cuno subsequently clarified his argument and does not accept Gerber's claim (Cuno 1992: 10–11).

3 A prominent example of the use of the concept of feudalism in the service of modernization theory and Lebanese Christian exceptionalism is Harik 1968. Harik's designation of Lebanon as feudal is criticized by Chevallier (1971: 84–85) on grounds that are somewhat formalist. Khalaf (1987) also tends towards an exceptionalist modernization theory understanding of Lebanon. Schölch (1986) and Havemann (1991) use the term "feudalism" without these associations.

4 Following Doumani and Tamari (1982: 188), I use the term "patron–client relations" descriptively, not in the sense of an extended system as suggested in Gellner 1977. For a critique of patron–client relations as a system or a framework for the analysis of political economy and social order see Gilsenan 1977.

5 Marsot uses the term "mercantilism" rather than "industrial revolution," but her argument is otherwise similar to Fahmy's. Clark (1974) suggests a similar argument for Anatolia, which is dismissed by Pamuk (1987: 250–51 n. 62).

2 OTTOMAN REFORM AND EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM, 1839–1907

1 My formulation develops those of Roger Owen and E. J. Hobsbawm (Owen 1972; Owen 1989; Hobsbawm 1989). In the 1950s and 1960s the school of British imperial and commonwealth historians and others pursuing an intellectual agenda shaped by the cold war denied any structural relationship between the depression of 1873–96, intensified competition of European powers for control of markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities in Asia and Africa, and European military conquest and rule in those territories (Robinson & Gallagher 1961; Louis 1976). A central project of the materialist approaches to history that reemerged in the subsequent generation was to establish that imperialism was a valid category of historical analysis and that the scramble for Africa and other European incursions into the non-European world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were related to changes in the character of capitalism which intensified military and political competition among European powers (Owen & Sutcliffe 1972; Brewer 1990; Kennedy 1996; Wolfe 1997).

2 Maoz (1968) argues the standard Orientalist position with some qualifications. On the conflict of civilizations see Huntington 1996.

3 This figure is based on Schilcher (1985: 91). She carefully surveys the figures of casualty estimates, which range from 600 to 10,000.

4 Several pages distant from an orthodox Marxist declaration supported by a quote from Lenin, I. M. Smilianskaya offers a more nuanced formulation, roughly compatible with Gilsenan's approach, that changes in the agrarian regime resulted in a "complex combination of feudal exploitation and capitalistic elements" (Smilianskaya 1966: 239).
5 Meijer (1985: 25–38) offers an exposition and al-Disuqi (1981) a critique of these views.
6 Owen (1981a: 164) has a less positive evaluation of the movement's success.

4 FIKRI AL-KHULI'S JOURNEY TO AL-MAHALLA AL-KUBRA

1 Bayram al-Tunisi and others did speak to and about workers and peasants, but in ways very different from *al-Rihla*. See Beinin 1994a.
2 In addition to Sawsan El-Messiri, as far as I know, the only others who have written about *al-Rihla* are Ellis Goldberg (1994) and Amina Rachid (1991). Goldberg uses *al-Rihla* as evidence for his argument that workers were more rational than capitalists. I agree that workers were neither irrational or childish in the manner imagined by most of the *effendiyya* and the elites. But it is not clear that the behavior of workers at Misr Spinning and Weaving was rational in post-Enlightenment terms. Rachid assimilates *al-Rihla* to the progressivist, nationalist modernity of the *effendiyya* by characterizing it as "an expression of the consciousness of a proletarian class that is still embryonic, still close to its peasant origin" (p. 364).
3 This formulation rejects Spivak's argument in her widely discussed essay (1988) that subalterns cannot speak in favor of the one advanced by Gail Hershatter:

> If we replace "The subaltern cannot speak" (or, what I take to be closer to Spivak's actual argument, "The subaltern cannot represent herself in discourse") with "Many subalterns making cacophonous noise, some hogging the mike, many speaking intermittently and not exactly as they please, and all aware to some degree of the political uses of their own representation in that historical moment," we probably have a closer approximation of the situation confronting historians. If we are lucky, we also have a way out of the "disappearing subaltern" impasse in which any subaltern who speaks loses the right to that status. Finally, we have a chance to complicate the picture of one overarching discourse, in which subalterns appear only as positioned by their elite spokespersons. This picture might be fruitfully replaced not with a conception of "competing discourses" (with its overtones of free market bonanza and may the best discourse win) but with a recognition that some discourses can be seen only *in relation* to each other. (Hershatter 1997: 26)

4 "Turn, Motor!" Lyrics by Bayram al-Tunisi, as sung by Layla Murad in *Sayyidat al-Qitar*:

> Turn, motor, turn!
>
> Play your role, the greatest role.
> Turn as you like, and wind your thread.
> Don't mind the supervisor and the counter.
> Turn, motor, turn!

Free Egypt would rather go naked
Than dress in imported fabric:
Neither pink silk nor calico.
Turn, motor, turn!

Take this from our hands, our brother:
Something beautiful,
Of really strong manufacture, indeed strong.
Go to hell London and Bristol!
Turn, motor, turn!

We are the spindle.
We are the loom.
We are the finisher.
We are the exporters to Marseille and Darfur [Sudan].
Turn, motor, turn!

The age of industry is the age of victory.
Wear the crown of glory, Egypt!
Build your skyscrapers seventy stories high.
Turn, motor, turn!

Translated by Nancy Reynolds, with input from Ahmed Abdalla and Joel Beinin

5 For an argument that workers were able to do so, see Goldberg 1994.

5 POPULIST NATIONALISM, STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT, AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, 1939–1973

1 Information in this section is drawn from Lockman 1996 and Beinin 1990.
2 Information in this section is drawn from Beinin & Lockman 1987 and Beinin 1990.
3 Information in this section is drawn from Batatu 1978: 470–75, 545–66, 616–24, 666–70, 749–57 and Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett 1983.

6 POST-POPULIST REFORMATION OF THE WORKING CLASS AND PEASANTRY

1 For another frank admission of the limits of Washington consensus policies by a zealous advocate, see Clawson 1992.
2 Posusney translates the name of the labor federation as Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF).
3 Important exceptions are Goldberg 1986 and Posusney 1997.
4 For Tunisia, King's argument is supported by Radwan et al. 1991.

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